Russland, die EU und die Ukraine: kein Tauziehen

Worum ist es bei der Präsidentenwahl in der Ukraine wirklich
gegangen? Russische, aber auch westliche, Medien scheinen der
Meinung zu sein, dass die Ukraine Gegenstand eines Tauziehens
zwischen Russland und dem Westen geworden sei. Es treffe zu, dass
sich die Beziehungen zwischen der EU und Russland in den letzten
Jahren verschlechtert haben und dass sie sich
nicht darauf einigen können, was für die Ukraine das Beste
wäre. Aber die Vorstellung, dass die EU die Ukraine aus
der Einflusssphäre Russlands reißen wolle, sei falsch. Diese
‚Briefing Note‘ von Katinka Barysch und Charles
Grant,  die vom Centre for European
Reform veröffentlicht wurde, 
erklärt warum, und zeigt auf, welche Lektionen Russland und die EU
vom derzeitigen Machtkampf lernen können.

What has been the real choice in Ukraine’s presidential
election? To judge not only from the Russian media, but also from
some western newspapers, Ukraine is the subject of a tug of war
between Russia and the West. It is true that the West and Russia
have different views on what is best for Ukraine. But this does not
mean that Ukraine has become the battleground of a new geopolitical
great game between East and West. Many Ukrainians, and most
European governments, see the crisis as a struggle between a
corrupt, semi-authoritarian regime and a movement that is committed
to democratic reform and economic opening. 

So far, the EU has performed well in this crisis, speaking with
a single voice. But it now faces serious problems in its already
strained relationship with Russia. The EU needs to stand up for its
principles of democracy and non-interference in other countries’
affairs, while doing its best to limit the damage to that important
relationship. In particular, it needs to persuade the Russians that
they should work with the EU to sort out the problems of their
common neighbourhood.

As far as most Europeans and Americans are concerned, Russian
conduct during and after Ukraine’s presidential elections has
displayed an alarming tendency to revert to Cold War-style
thinking. Many Russians assume that the EU’s position is the mirror
image of Kremlin’s: an attempt to control Ukraine by installing
‘our’ man in Kiev. This assumption has been fuelled by Kremlin
propaganda and reinforced by some western commentators, who have
taken up the idea that a new Cold War is tearing Ukraine apart. It
is true that some right-wing Republicans, notably those active in
Washington think-tanks, play up to this caricature. These Americans
argue that anything that weakens Russia must be good for the US,
but they are neither the majority nor those in charge of US policy
on Russia. 

The recent and rapid deterioration of EU-Russia relations might
appear to give some plausibility to the tug-of-war thesis. At their
last summit in November, the two sides openly disagreed over
Ukraine. They even failed to strike a deal on deeper co-operation
in areas where they should find common cause, such as trade, energy
or the fight against terrorism. Many Russian leaders now view the
EU as a hostile power that is expanding into Russia’s traditional
sphere of influence. The EU, meanwhile, has become increasingly
concerned about Russia’s eroding democratic standards and weak
regard for human rights. Events in Ukraine have reinforced each
side’s worst fears of the other. While the EU admonished Ukraine’s
rulers for skewing the electoral playing field in favour of Victor
Yanukovich, Putin supported him as best he could. While the EU has
refused to acknowledge the results of the second round run-off,
Putin rushed to congratulate Yanukovich for his supposed
success.

However, the European policy on Ukraine is not driven by a
desire to weaken Russia. The theory that the EU is planning to grab
Ukraine, and pluck it from the Russian sphere of influence, simply
does not fit the facts: 

• As in the case of other post-Soviet states, Russia has backed a
  particular leader – in this case Yanukovich – because it assumes
  that he will safeguard Russian interests. Whether this leader is
  elected, appointed or has fallen from space is immaterial to
  Moscow. In contrast, the EU ultimately cares little who is in
  charge in Ukraine – or Belarus or Georgia – provided that person
  gains legitimacy through fair elections and upholds western
  standards of democracy and human rights. The EU cannot endorse the
  results of the second round of voting in Ukraine’s presidential
  elections because the OSCE observers reported widespread abuse,
  principally by Yanukovich’s supporters. Russia bets on personality.
  The EU defends process.
• Ever since Ukraine became independent, the EU has shown
  remarkably little interest in it. For many years, Ukraine has asked
  the EU to acknowledge it as a potential candidate for membership.
  The EU’s answer has been a consistent ‘no’. Except for the Poles
  and the Lithuanians, who have only just joined the EU, most
  Europeans regard the prospect of Ukrainian membership of the EU
  with horror. The EU is finding it difficult enough to digest the
  ten countries that have just joined, and it is struggling to decide
  what to do about Turkey’s bid for membership. Many European
  governments would very happily leave Ukraine in Russia’s orbit,
  rather than worry about the integration of a large, backward and
  fissiparous country. The Union is a reluctant and haphazard
  imperialist: its continued expansion depends not on its leaders’
  desire to extend territory, but on its attraction for neighbouring
  countries.
• The Kremlin blatantly endorsed Yanukovich for the presidency,
  while no western leader openly stood up for Victor Yushchenko.
  Nevertheless the Yanukovich camp portray Yushchenko as a western
  puppet. In fact, many in Yushchenko’s liberal and reformist camp
  feel that the EU has let them down. And his relationship with
  Washington is ambiguous. Yushchenko has promised to pull Ukraine’s
  1,600 troops out of Iraq, should he win the presidency. Yanukovich
  was the one who sent them there.

The fact is that any Ukrainian president will have to seek good
relations with both the West and Russia. The EU is Ukraine’s most
important trading partner, Russia is its key energy supplier, and
both are crucial for the country’s security. Ukraine’s East-West
balancing act will probably be more difficult after the elections,
but just as essential to its survival as a unitary state.

To read the article in full, visit the Centre for European Reform website.