Kroatien und die EU: Folgen des Gotovina-Debakels

Die kroatische Regierung hat ihre Glaubwürdigkeit im Gotovina-Fall verspielt. Dies könnte ihrer Beliebtheit laut eines Artikels von Transition Online mehr schaden, als die Auslieferung des mutmaßlichen Kriegsverbrechers an das UN-Kriegsverbrechertribunal in Den Haag.

Die kroatische Regierung hat ihre Glaubwürdigkeit im Gotovina-Fall verspielt. Dies könnte ihrer Beliebtheit laut eines Artikels von Transition Online mehr schaden, als die Auslieferung des mutmaßlichen Kriegsverbrechers an das UN-Kriegsverbrechertribunal in Den Haag.

The decision by EU foreign ministers not to begin accession negotiations with Croatia on 17 March, as originally scheduled, undoubtedly sends a strong message to Zagreb as well as the region’s other EU aspirants that impunity for war crimes is irreconcilable with European integration. The talks will now be opened only after Brussels establishes that Croatia is fully cooperating with the Hague-based International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY).

The specific issue that stands in the way of Croatia’s EU entry talks is, of course, that of General Ante Gotovina, who is accused of crimes against ethnic Serbs in Operation Oluja in 1995 , which he commanded. Those crimes include the unlawful killing of at least 150 people in the rebel-Serb region of Krajina, as well as the organized plunder and destruction of their property, actions that ICTY prosecutors allege were designed to prevent Serb refugees from returning to Croatia.

After weeks of uncertainty, most EU countries–including the big four, Britain, France, Germany, and Italy–took the view that Zagreb has not done enough to arrest Gotovina. A key element in this assessment was a letter from ICTY Chief Prosecutor Carla del Ponte in which she told the ministers that „Ante Gotovina remains within reach of the Croatian authorities and until such time as he is brought to The Hague, it cannot be said that Croatia is cooperating fully with the International Tribunal.“ But the EU stance was perhaps crucially influenced by the British government, whose attempts to provide Zagreb with assistance in tracking down Gotovina had been sabotaged by rogue elements inside the Croatian security services.

A British intelligence operation, launched in early 2003 and aimed at assisting Zagreb in what were believed to be its sincere efforts to locate and arrest Gotovina, ended up in a shambles, with the identities of British and Croatian operatives working on the case leaked to the press and their lives put at risk. Unsurprisingly, the failure of Operation Cash—the Croat term for cash being ***gotovina***—coupled with Prime Minister Ivo Sanader’s failure to deal efficiently with the consequences of the “Cash” fiasco only hardened Britain’s resolve to insist on Gotovina’s extradition as an absolute test of Croatia’s fitness to start accession talks. In recent months, as more details of the Croat sabotage and indolence emerged, it became increasingly clear that other key EU countries would eventually come to share the British view. Most crucially, this included Germany, which had previously argued that Zagreb’s cooperation with The Hague could not be judged on the Gotovina case only.

To read the full article, visit the Transitions Online website.