Finanzpolitische Herausforderungen der neuen Mitgliedstaaten
In ihrer Analyse von Marek Dabrowski, Malgorzata Antczak und Michal Gorzelak, die für ein im November 2004 stattfindenden Workshop der GD ECFIN ausgearbeitet wurde und von Polens Zentrum für Sozial- und Wirtschaftsforschung (CASE) veröffentlicht wurde, werden die finanzpolitische Situation der neuen EU-Mitgliedstaaten sowie ihre Aussichten zusammengefasst. Den Ausgangspunkt bildet der Stabilitäts- und Wachstumspakt der EU.
In ihrer Analyse von Marek
Dabrowski, Malgorzata Antczak
und Michal Gorzelak, die für ein im November
2004 stattfindenden Workshop der GD ECFIN ausgearbeitet wurde
und von Polens Zentrum für Sozial- und
Wirtschaftsforschung (CASE) veröffentlicht wurde, werden die
finanzpolitische Situation der neuen EU-Mitgliedstaaten sowie ihre
Aussichten zusammengefasst. Den Ausgangspunkt bildet der
Stabilitäts- und Wachstumspakt der EU.
1. Introduction
After May 1, 2004 the new member states (NMS) will be the
subject of the same fiscal rules determined by the Treaty on the
European Union and Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) as the old
member states (OMS). This will be a quite new situation for NMS
because at the accession stage their fiscal situation was not the
subject of a regular and binding surveillance apart from preparing
and presenting Pre-accession Economic Programs. The latter,
however, had a character of a rather loose projection without any
legal consequences of breaching the declared fiscal targets and did
not influence seriously the actual outcomes of fiscal policy in
individual countries.
Apart from being subject of the standard EU fiscal surveillance
rules most of NMS expresses its interest to enter the Economic and
Monetary Union (EMU) and meeting the fiscal convergence criteria
seems to be the most serious obstacle on this road at least for
some candidates.
The individual fiscal situation of NMS at the day of EU
accession differed, with Baltic countries and Slovenia representing
a healthier fiscal stance and ‘Visegrad group’ countries, Cyprus
and Malta suffering serious fiscal problems. In addition, NMS have
to deal in short to medium run with negative fiscal consequences of
the EU accession (contribution to the EU budget, co-financing and
pre-financing EU transfers, and costs of
adopting acquis).
Although in early years of their membership NMS may still
demonstrate certain specific characteristics of their fiscal
situation and policies, in a medium to long-term perspective the
nature of their fiscal problems will not differ from what can be
observed and expected in OMS. This relates, for example, to the
high level of fiscal redistribution caused by the excessive level
of social-related expenditures, further challenged by the expected
consequences of population aging. Thus, most of OMS and NMS will
continue to face serious fiscal strains in the next decades. On a
microeconomic level, both the incumbent and new members have to
increase competitiveness of their economies and excessive fiscal
burden is one of the serious obstacles staying on this road. Thus,
we believe there are no convincing arguments to treat NMS in a
different way than OMS and any modification of the fiscal
surveillance rules (if justified) must relate to the entire EU-25
(or EU-27 few years down the road).
Our paper will concentrate on the detail analysis of fiscal
challenges faced by the NMS with special attention given to eight
transition economies of Central Europe and Baltic region (NMS-8).
We will also try to answer to what extent the existing EU fiscal
surveillance rules provide the sufficient guarantees of a long-term
fiscal sustainability of both OMS and NMS and will they need in
modification?
The paper is organized in the following way. The next section
will analyze fiscal situation of NMS at the day of entry to the EU
and differences between them. Section 3 will extend this analysis
with an attempt to estimate fiscal costs of EU accession for NMS.
In Section 4 we will try to discuss the prospects and
conditions of meeting by NMS fiscal convergence criteria as defined
by the Treaty of the European Union and SGP. Section 5 will remind
long term fiscal challenges coming mostly from the unfavorable
demographic trends, which face both OMS and NMS in a not so distant
future. Section 6 will address the hot issue do the EU fiscal
surveillance rules need in modification? Finally, Section 7 will
shortly summarize the main findings and offer
conclusions.
Significant part of this paper draws from an earlier research
works of the authors and the entire CASE macroeconomic research
team. This relates particularly to the recent CASE research project
on prospects of the EMU enlargement. However, authors take the sole
responsibility for the content of this paper, its quality and
presented conclusions. The views and opinions presented here are
those of the authors and not necessarily of the institutions, which
they work for or which granted a support for this research
work.
