Die Rolle der Korruptionsbekämpfung im EU-Beitrittsprozess der Türkei

In sowohl der einheimischen als auch internationalen
Boulevardpresse wird die Türkei zumeist als extrem korrupt
dargestellt. Die eigentliche Frage sei jedoch nicht, ob die
Türkei korrupt ist oder nicht, sondern ob das Land mit Staaten
vergleichbar ist, die der EU bereits beigetreten sind. Diese
Auffassung vertritt Bryane Michael in einem
in der Turkish Policy Quarterly
veröffentlichten Artikel.

Anti-corruption will feature prominently in Turkey’s talks
on EU accession. Despite claims to the contrary, the data show that
corruption levels in Turkey are not radically different than those
in many other accession countries. While Turkey already meets many
of the requirements for negotiating and completing accession,
Turkey will need to bolster its anti-corruption programme. Key
elements will include increased public sector co-ordination and the
design and implementation of a credible anti-corruption programme.
Yet, accession should not be the main motivator for such a
programme. Anti-corruption will be necessary to strengthen fragile
government institutions and forestall the radicalization of the
political process. 

The December 2004 meeting of Turkish and European Union (EU)
officials will have determined much about the eventual Turkish
accession into the EU. The focus of these talks will be on issues
such as the compatibility of Turkish legislation with
the acquis communautaire, immigration, human rights
and other points of contention between the EU and Turkey. If the
accession of other countries into the EU is any indicator for
Turkish accession, reducing corruption and improving the rule of
law will figure prominently in these discussions. Anti-corruption
gets its own section in the EU’s Regular Reports on Progress Toward
Accession. Yet, despite claims to the contrary, Turkey is not
radically different from the other accession countries both in the
level of corruption and the amount (level) of anti-corruption
activity. However, it has engaged less wholehearted in
anti-corruption programmes than many of the other accession
countries. In this essay, I will compare Turkey with some of the
other accession countries – along the very specific and concrete
measure of corruption and anticorruption – to assess the claims
that the Turkish accession will be radically different than the
other accessions. Such a comparison will provide some insights for
the design and implementation of Turkey’s anti-corruption
agenda. 

Talking Turkey: A Comparison of Turkish Corruption with
Other Accession Countries 

In both the domestic and international popular press, Turkey is
largely painted to be extremely corrupt. For example, a November
24th Financial Times article notes that “two former Turkish energy
ministers are due in court tomorrow in a case that, if it ends in
prosecution, may shed light on an issue that fascinates and
horrifies many Turks – the extent of corruption in the country’s
political and commercial life.” Certainly Turkey has seen its share
of high level politicians under the spotlight – including two
Former Ministers of Energy and Natural Resources, namely Cumhur
Ersümer and Zeki Çakan, Former Prime Minister Mesut Y›lmaz, Former
Deputy Prime Minister Hüsamettin Özkan, Former Minister of State in
Charge of Economics, Former Ministers of Public Works and Housing
Yaflar Topçu and Koray Aydin, who is also a former minister of
public works and housing. In the same article an unnamed source at
Transparency International said that corruption “is one of the most
serious obstacles to Turkey’s accession” and notes a culture of
“endemic political corruption.” These cases ostensibly will affect
the prospects of Turkish accession. Indeed, the European Commission
and the European Parliament have made reference to Turkey in their
reports on the country’s suitability for membership.

Yet, the real question is not whether Turkey is corrupt or not –
but whether it is comparable to countries which have already
acceded. Such prosecutions certainly contribute to popular
perceptions of a corrupt Turkish polity. However, these
prosecutions may also signal a changing environment and an
increasing willingness to fight corruption. If the nature and level
of corruption is roughly the same as the other countries, the EU
will have a tough time refusing Turkish accession on rule of law
grounds alone. 

The data show a mixed picture. According to one of the best
known indicators, the Transparency International (2002) Corruption
Perceptions Index, Turkey rates 64 among 102 countries in the
Index. This ranking is 12 places below the Czech Republic, Slovakia
and Latvia (higher numbers imply more integrity) – yet 13 places
above Romania. Using the “gold standard” of anti-corruption data,
we see from Figure 1 that Turkey certainly has less control of
corruption than the “first wave” accession countries. However,
Turkey is closer to the “second wave” countries of Bulgaria and
Romania, being statistically indistinguishable from either of them.
From the numbers alone (assuming they are correct), failing to open
talks with Turkey on the grounds of its corruption profile while
conducting negotiations with Bulgaria and Romania would suggest
non-technical factors are driving the EU accession
process. 

To read the article in full, visit the European Stability Initiative (ESI) website.